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Abstract
The principle of energy conservation is widely taken to be a se-
rious difficulty for interactionist dualism (whether property or sub-
stance). Interactionists often have therefore tried to make it satisfy
energy conservation. This paper examines several such attempts,
especially including E. J. Lowe’s varying constants proposal, show-
ing how they all miss their goal due to lack of engagement with
the physico-mathematical roots of energy conservation physics: the
first Noether theorem (that symmetries imply conservation laws),
its converse (that conservation laws imply symmetries), and the
locality of continuum/field physics. Thus the “conditionality re-
sponse”, which sees conservation as (bi)conditional upon symme-
tries and simply accepts energy non-conservation as an aspect of
interactionist dualism, is seen to be, perhaps surprisingly, the one
most in accord with contemporary physics (apart from quantum
mechanics) by not conflicting with mathematical theorems basic to
physics. A decent objection to interactionism should be a posteri-
ori, based on empirically studying the brain.
1. The Objection from Energy Conservation
Formulated
Among philosophers of mind and metaphysicians, it is widely believed
that the principle of energy conservation poses a serious problem to inter-
actionist dualism. Insofar as this objection afflicts interactionist dualisms,
it applies to property dualism of that sort (i.e., not epiphenomenalist) as
much as to substance dualism (Crane 2001, pp. 40, 43, 50).1 Though
less prominent than energy conservation, momentum conservation is, as a
1The term “substance dualism” suggests willingness to call the body a substance,
which one might deny even while accepting strong claims about the independence of
the mind from the body.
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physical principle, on equal footing with energy conservation and poses the
same kind of objection (Cornman 1978). In fact, Leibniz’s conservation-
based objection against substance dualism appealed to the conservation
of momentum as well as energy (vis viva) (Garber 1983a, Leibniz 1985,
p. 156). Any successful treatment must address the conservation of energy
and momentum (as well as any other relevant laws that might seem vio-
lated, such as the conservation of angular momentum), a fact that thwarts
some naive attempts to make interactionist dualism physics-friendly.
If there were a good objection from energy conservation, then presum-
ably philosophers of physics would endorse it on such occasions as they
treat the philosophy of mind (which are admittedly rare, in contrast to the
logical positivists’ discussions). While Bunge (1980, p. 17) endorses the
objection from energy conservation (albeit without any clear argument;
Pitts 2019a), Butterfield (1997, p. 142) explicitly rejects it:
... [A] traditional argument against interactionism is flawed, be-
cause of this false picture of physics. ... The idea is that any causal
interaction between mind and matter would violate the principle of
the conservation of energy. ... (Though traditional, the argument is
still current; for example, Dennett endorses it (1991, pp. 34–35).)
This argument is flawed, for two reasons. The first reason is obvi-
ous: who knows how small, or in some other way hard to measure,
these energy gains or losses in brains might be? ... But the second
reason is more interesting, and returns us to the danger of assuming
that physics is cumulative. Namely, the principle of the conserva-
tion of energy is not sacrosanct [having been questioned in the past
and present in quantum contexts].
In short: physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons to think phys-
icalism is true, arising from naivety about physics.
One of us has recently explained in further detail some of what Butterfield
presumably had in mind (Pitts 2019a).
Interestingly, one does not always see a proper formulation of the ob-
jection from energy conservation in the literature. At times worries about
energy conservation are conflated with some version of the “causal nexus
problem” (see, e.g., Dennett 1991, pp. 34f, Fodor 1998, McGinn 1999,
p. 92, Westphal 2016, pp. 41-44). The causal nexus problem involves the
intuition that there does not seem to be any causal interface between non-
physical and physical entities that would allow the non-physical entities
to interact with the physical world. In correspondence with Descartes,
Gassendi and Princess Elisabeth (Garber 1983b) expressed difficulty see-
ing how a non-spatial soul could interact with a body that has the property
of extension; the worry and related ones continue to this day. The problem
is also aggravated by Descartes’s making souls non-spatial, a view that
not all early modern or contemporary dualists share. The metaphysical
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type of objection, though significant (but see Ducasse 1951, Chap. 18, for
a dissenting view), is quite distinct from Leibniz’s later physical objection
from conservation laws.
A version of the objection from energy conservation that addresses the
conservation issue without confusing it with more general causal worries
can be found from John Searle (2004, p. 42):
Physics says that the amount of matter/energy in the universe is
constant, but substance dualism seems to imply that there is an-
other kind of energy, mental energy or spiritual energy, that is not
fixed by physics. So if substance dualism is true then it seems that
one of the most fundamental laws of physics, the law of conserva-
tion, must be false.
Searle’s version is interesting in two respects. First, his version of the
principle of energy conservation – which differs substantially from the
one modern physics holds (on which more below) – is probably the one
most widely used by non-physicists. Second, he aptly points out that the
crux lies in an apparent contradiction between dualism and the principle
of energy conservation, assuming that in this case dualism will have to
yield, given the fundamentality of the principle of energy conservation.
His talk of mental energy, by contrast, is confused. We hardly have a
notion what “mental energy” might be; the better one understands physi-
cal energy in terms of the relevant mathematics (Noether 1918, Kosmann-
Schwarzbach 2011), the less sense the idea of mental energy makes (see
Sec. 5 for more on this). Furthermore, mental energy would only be rele-
vant in this context if it affected the physical world, which influence Searle
neglects to mention explicitly in this passage. (If the archangel Michael
had some kind of mental energy but it did not affect the physical world,
his doings would be irrelevant to interactionist dualism and would not
violate any physical conservation law.) What Searle should say is that if
nonphysical minds2 affected the physical world (interactionist dualism),
then they would cause energy changes in the physical world, resulting in a
violation of the principle of energy conservation, but since that principle
is too fundamental to be false, such interactionist dualism must be false.
A bit more formally, the argument could run as follows as a formalized
objection from energy conservation:
P1 If nonphysical minds influenced the physical universe, then the en-
ergy of the physical universe would not be constant (ex hypothesi).
P2 The energy of the physical universe is constant (with physical ne-
cessity).
2There are dualistic accounts which construe the mind as partly physical (e.g.,
Collins 2011b).
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C Therefore, it is false that nonphysical minds influence the physical
universe (by modus tollens).
Though Searle initially only asserts energy conservation as a matter of
fact, the physical necessity ascription to conservation is inspired by Searle’s
claim that “one of the most fundamental laws of physics” is involved. It
seems that it is the modal version alone that gives the physicalist hope for
an a priori argument against dualism which avoids dealings with empiri-
cal science beyond whatever was involved in arriving at the conservation
of energy in the 19th century, which had more to do with steam than with
brains.
The formalized objection from energy conservation still has room for
improvement. In particular, the global appeal to the whole universe in P2
seems unnecessary, at least if telekinesis is excluded or limited to some fi-
nite region and physics has no action at a distance (which indeed current
physics does not in this sense). A simple and plausible version of that
assumption is to assume that dualist minds affect only brains. Then a
conservation claim for brains should suffice for P2, if one can be suitably
formulated, irrespective of what is happening on Mars or Alpha Cen-
tauri. In fact, the global version makes P2 more vulnerable, since there
is considerable doubt among cosmologists whether the total amount of
the universe’s energy can even be defined (Peebles 1993, p. 139). If cal-
culation is meaningful, the results sometimes disagree or give surprising
results (e.g., Nester et al. 2008). Total energy could fail to be defined
because there is just too much of it, giving an integral that diverges to
infinity, or perhaps because energy is bound up with coordinate systems
and hence cannot be globally integrated if the universe requires multiple
coordinate systems.3 One therefore should not rely on global notions of
energy conservation (E = constant) if more robust notions are available.
One might therefore suggest the modified version of the formalized
argument:
P1’ If nonphysical minds influenced brains, then energy would not be
conserved in brains.
P2’ Energy is conserved in brains (with physical necessity).
C’ Therefore, dualism is false (by modus tollens).
The shift from phrases such as “energy is constant” to “energy is con-
served” requires explanation. Constancy is straightforward: being the
same over time. For the whole physical universe, constancy might seem
like an adequate concept (but note the above difficulties). As regards the
brain, however, energy obviously changes in it all the time; as a living
3This latter problem could be addressed, though, by using a background notion of
covariant derivative, albeit nonuniquely (Sorkin 1988).
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organ, the brain is a swirling sea of metabolism and neural activity, and
in permanent matter and energy exchange with its immediate physiolog-
ical environment. In other words, the brain is an open system. How can
energy conservation be defined for an open system?
Here the fact (on which more below) that modern physics involves
local conservation laws makes its first appearance. Local conservation
laws describe conservation at every point in space, not (just?) for the
world as a whole. Starting with local conservation laws and adding them
up (integrating them) from different places, one gets a serviceable (albeit
logically weaker) formulation suitable for finite regions such as brains.
How can this local version of the principle of energy conservation be put
in non-mathematical terms?
A suitable formulation is Collins’s (2008, p. 34) boundary principle of
energy conservation (BPEC):
According to the BPEC, the rate of change of energy (...) in a
closed region of space is equal to the total rate of energy (...) flowing
through the spatial boundary of the region.
This principle is intended to be applicable to any and every region of space.
Thus energy cannot disappear in Cambridge and immediately reappear
in Liechtenstein, or disappear in Cambridge and reappear a bit later (due
to the speed of light) in Liechtenstein, or just disappear in Cambridge, or
just appear in Liechtenstein, etc., according to the BPEC and the local
conservation laws that it paraphrases. Thus, energy will be conserved in
a brain in the relevant sense if the energy change in the brain can be
accounted for by the amount of energy flowing through the brain’s spatial
boundaries. If someone thinks that an immaterial mind can act on the
whole body, then “brain” can be replaced with “body”. In summary, the
BPEC claims that there must be physical causes which explain the energy
change in an open system.
At this point a remark about quantum physics is in order. With the
advent of quantum mechanics and the Heisenberg uncertainty in particu-
lar, a certain “blur” arguably affects energy and momentum conservation
at the microscopic level. The Heisenberg uncertainty relation for quantum
mechanics says, roughly, that the blur in the momentum and the blur in
the position trade off such that their product is (at least) some constant
value related to Planck’s constant. There is also an energy-time uncer-
tainty relation. These uncertainties have been taken by Beck and Eccles
(1992) to allow for mental interactions without energy expenditure.
However, how these uncertainty relations fit with the exact conserva-
tion of energy and momentum in Feynman diagrams in quantum field the-
ory is not entirely obvious. Fully resolving such questions would require
addressing the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics,
which prima facie appears to call for partly replacing the (conservation-
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respecting) ordinary dynamics of quantum mechanics or quantum field
theory with occasional collapse of the wave function.4 For our purposes
it is not necessary to resolve such issues, because quantum mechanics, if
anything, makes life easier for the interactionist dualist, not harder (see
Sec. 6 for more on this). One therefore faces the energy conservation ob-
jection to interactionism in its strongest form by facing it in classical field
theory and ignoring quantum physics.
The view defended here is that the best response to the energy con-
servation objection – the response that reflects an understanding of the
relevant theoretical physics – is what has been called the “conditionality
response” (Pitts 2019a) that energy is conserved when and where minds do
not act on bodies, but is not conserved when and where minds act on bod-
ies. There are some works in the literature which have proposed the con-
ditionality of conservation. Descartes himself might have held such a view
(as applied to the conservation of motion, Garber 1983a). In the 18th cen-
tury Knutzen and Crusius explicitly held it (Watkins 1995, 1998). Newton
might well have held such a view (see McGuire 1968 and Dempsey 2006 5
for Newton’s strong affirmations of mental causation); while he didn’t take
the conservation of energy/vis viva to hold generally anyway, momentum
conservation would still be an issue. There seems to be little reason from
physics and no reason from the mind to expect Newton’s third law of
motion (action-reaction) to hold in the mind-body problem. Thus mo-
mentum conservation is a likely casualty of mental causation. Euler, who
first formulated local conservation laws (Euler 1755/1757), was a staunch
proponent of interactionism and vigorous opponent of Leibniz-Wolff pre-
established harmony (Euler 1768-1772), which was often motivated by the
conservation argument. Euler, the leading physicist of the mid-18th cen-
tury, can hardly have failed to understand the conservation argument, so
presumably he simply was not bothered by non-conservation. Indeed this
conditionality view might have been the usual view following the defeat
of pre-established harmony prior to Helmholtz’s renewed claim of univer-
sal conservation even including the mind. Clearly if the team involved
Descartes, Newton and Euler as well as Knutzen and Crusius, it was in a
strong position.
While more recent interactionists have often aspired to preserve con-
servation, a few 20th and 21st century interactionist dualists (or tempo-
rary sympathizers) have offered the conditionality response as well (e.g.,
Ducasse 1951, pp. 240–242, Larmer 1986, Plantinga 2007, Rodrigues 2014,
Lycan 2018), as have theists replying to an analogous objection against
divine interaction (e.g., Larmer 2014). However, reasonably detailed and
4We thank an anonymous referee for helping to clarify this point.
5We thank Steffen Ducheyne for the Dempsey reference. Dempsey distinguishes
Newton’s view from substance dualism, however; apparently it is mental and physical
properties that interact.
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physically well-informed accounts have been rare, two examples being
Averill and Keating (1981) and Plantinga (2007). Averill and Keating
(1981) hold that energy and momentum are conserved in a system so long
as no external force acts on it, but since the dualistic mind exerts an ex-
ternal force on the brain, non-conservation is to be expected. They also
rightly talk of mental force but not mental energy (which faces problems
pointed out below). However, Averill and Keating do not mention the
converse Noether theorem or the locality of energy conservation and do
not fully grasp the parallels between energy and momentum, which would
have made their arguments even stronger. Plantinga (2007) discusses the
locality of conservation, infers from symmetries to conservation laws, and
thus does not expect conservation where symmetries are violated, though
without making a clear inference from the converse first Noether theorem.
The conditionality response appears to be necessary (Pitts 2019a) also
partly because of the lack of success of the Mohrhoff-Collins invocation
(Mohrhoff 1997, Collins 2008, Collins 2011a) of general relativity on be-
half of interactionist dualism. They claim that general relativity already
excludes conservation laws for energy and momentum, so there is nothing
left for interactionist dualism to ruin. But at least formally, general rel-
ativity certainly does have conservation laws (Bergmann 1958, Anderson
1967, Schmutzer 1972, Misner et al. 1973, p. 465), perhaps stronger ones
than earlier theories have; it simply has been difficult to find a reasonable
physical interpretation of these relations, which involve “pseudotensors”.6
6A potential distraction is the zero covariant divergence of the material stress-
energy-momentum tensor ∇aTab = 0, ignoring gravitational energy, perhaps due to
its highly controversial status. This relation is true, important, and entailed by Ein-
stein’s field equations. However, it is not all that distinctive of Einstein’s theory,
because the material field equations of various other gravitational theories also imply
this relation (Freund et al. 1969, Wald 1984, p. 456). The crucial point, however, is
that typically ∇aTab = 0 simply does not imply the conservation of anything in the
usual sense of total = constant over time because the covariant divergence cannot be
integrated (Weyl 1922, pp. 236, 269–271, Misner et al. 1973, p. 465, Landau and Lif-
shitz 1975, p. 280, Lord 1976, p. 139, Stephani 1990, p. 141); neither does it imply
the “continuity equation” describing local conservation laws, which will be discussed
in detail below. Rather, ∇aTab = 0 is a balance equation saying at what rate material
energy and momentum are produced/destroyed due to gravitational influence.
Given that formally there are other conservation relations (involving a “pseudotensor”
tab of gravitational stress-energy-momentum along with the material stress-energy-
momentum Tab) that do involve the continuity equation and do imply total = constant
over time, the pseudotensor relations are more relevant to the question at hand. Pseu-
dotensor laws have been difficult to interpret physically and hence tend to get little
attention, but they are still true and are the closest analogs of the conservation laws
in earlier theories. The formal pseudotensor conservation laws follow from Noether’s
theorem due to symmetries (uniformities of nature) and vice versa by the converse
Noether theorem, whereas the relation of zero covariant divergence of the material
stress-energy follows instead from matter’s coupling only to a space-time metric and
is not essentially connected to uniformities of nature. A reasonable theory of gravity
could fail to include ∇aTab = 0 if matter doesn’t couple solely to a metric tensor
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Now one can avoid contestable interpretations and do new calculations
showing that general relativity makes it harder, not easier, for souls to
act on bodies (Pitts 2019b). One can, if one interprets gravitational energy
mathematics literally or realistically (Pitts 2010), view this new general
relativistic objection as a strengthened energy conservation objection, but
that is optional.
We can now discuss several unsuccessful efforts to reconcile interaction-
ist dualism with physical conservation laws. All of them aim at refuting
P1’: If nonphysical minds influenced brains, then energy would not be
conserved in brains.
2. Unsuccessful Dualist Responses I:
Energy Redistribution vs. Symmetry
This type of response claims that the mind does not add or subtract
energy but redistributes the existing amount of energy. Thus, the hope is,
the mind can interact with the brain while respecting energy conservation
by deducting or otherwise compensating energy from elsewhere. Instances
of this idea can be found, e.g., in the works of Broad (1937, p. 108), Dilley
(2004, p. 142), Meixner (2008, p. 18) and Gibb (2010). This proposal,
though somewhat common, fails for more than one reason, and so will be
addressed in this section and the next.
One problem is that it fails to recognize that conservation laws are
consequences of symmetries by Noether’s first theorem (Noether 1918,
Goldstein 1980, Chap. 12-7). A continuous symmetry is described by a
parameter that can be as small as you like, such as a translation by 1 m, or
1 mm, or 10−6 m, or ..., rather than by an essentially large transformation
such as a reflection of a right hand into a left hand. A symmetry such as
time (or space) translation means that the laws do not treat any time (or
place) as special, a kind of uniformity of nature. When there is a single
independent variable (time), Noether’s theorem leads to the constancy
(zero time derivative, that is, zero rate of change over time) of the corre-
sponding quantity. When there are multiple independent variables (time
and space), Noether’s theorem leads to the continuity equation, which
relates the rate of change of the density of a quantity with the amount
of the quantity spewing out (the divergence of the current density). A
simple analogy would involve the number of persons in a room (assuming
(Blanchet 1992, Pitts 2016), so an attempted conservation objection to interactionist
dualism using this relation would be both novel and unconvincing. If one attempts to
take Noether’s (first) theorem seriously, one can view some of the peculiarities of pseu-
dotensors as due to their describing infinitely many conserved energies and momenta,
not just one and three (respectively), so it is unmotivated to expect distinct conserved
quantities to be equivalent (Pitts 2010).
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no conceptions/births or deaths): the number of persons changes only in-
sofar as people enter or leave through the doors; people never disappear,
pop into existence, or teleport into or out of the room. The mathematical
form of the continuity equation will appear below. As noted above, in
many circumstances one can integrate (add up) the continuity equation
over “all space” and derive constancy of the total amount of the quantity
in question (energy, momentum, angular momentum, or the like.) But
the global form is not fundamental and might not exist mathematically
(see Sec. 1). Integrating over some part of the universe also gives useful
results.
Energy conservation follows from time translation invariance; momen-
tum conservation follows from spatial translation invariance (Goldstein
1980). In other words, if the physical laws are the same over time, then
the amount of energy does not change over time; if the physical laws are
the same across space, then the amount of momentum does not change
over time. Hence nonphysical mental influence, being restricted in time
and place to the times and places where minds act on brains, will violate
the assumptions on which the conservation laws are based. Thus it might
well be the case that energy and momentum are not conserved, if non-
physical minds act on brains. Note further that if such symmetries hold in
some regions and fail in others, then the corresponding conservation laws
will hold in the symmetric regions and fail in the non-symmetric regions.
Symmetries need not apply to the entire universe to imply conservation
laws, as will be evident from the calculations below. If souls exist only
on the surface of the Earth while human beings exist, then conservation
of energy and momentum apply everywhere away from the surface of the
Earth while human beings exist, etc. While energy conservation is often
called the first law of thermodynamics, energy non-conservation due to
souls does not need to worry engineers who design thermodynamic sys-
tems: assuming that there are no souls in refrigerators, then energy is
conserved there and the relevant (spatially localized) portion of the first
law of thermodynamics still holds. Thus Bunge’s catastrophe, in which
“physics, chemistry, biology, and economics would collapse” due to energy
non-conservation (Bunge 1980, p. 17), is a fantasy, absent some reason to
think that the extent of non-conservation would be large.
One can say more. Due to the converse of Noether’s first theorem
(Noether 1918, Brown and Holland 2004, Kosmann-Schwarzbach 2011),
conservation laws imply symmetries, or contrapositively, non-symmetries
(singling out some times and places over others) imply non-conservation.
The Noether theorem with its converse entails a biconditionality between
a continuous symmetry and a conserved quantity.
Continuous Symmetry ←→ Conserved Quantity
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Thus the action of a non-physical mind on the brain, assuming that the
mind does not act in exactly that same way at every moment in time and
every point in space throughout the entire universe (which seems a safe
assumption), does indeed entail non-conservation of energy (by singling
out some times as those when the mind acts on the brain) and non-
conservation of momentum (by singling out some places as those where
the mind acts, presumably within the brain only).7 Interactionists need to
accept this fact, not devise allegedly physics-respecting dodges that con-
travene basic theorems in real physics. This non-conservation inference is
not an objection to interactionism, however (or not much of one), because
the hypothesis of interactionism defeats the presumption that one should
be able to extrapolate inductively from conservation where minds do not
act to conservation everywhere. It is a direct consequence of Lagrangian
local field theory that if non-physical minds affect the physical world (as
described by classical fields) in some times and places but not others, then
minds produce and/or destroy energy and momentum at some times and
places. If one wonders how an immaterial mind is able to produce or
destroy energy, this question is not an appropriate candidate for an intu-
ition because energy is a technical notion in physics. Either Lagrangian
field theory gives the answer, or one has shifted from a physical objection
involving energy to a Princess Elisabeth-style metaphysical objection that
nonphysical minds ought not to be able to affect bodies (see Sec. 1).
Typically one can read off momentum and/or energy conservation from
the Lagrangian, the function that (using the principle of least action) fixes
the equations of motion; in simple cases the Lagrangian is the kinetic en-
ergy minus the potential energy. If no spatial variable (usually x, y, z)
figures in it (i.e., if the Lagrangian does not explicitly depend on place),
momentum is conserved. If the Lagrangian depends on x but not y or
z, then momentum in the x-direction is not conserved, but momentum is
conserved in the y- and z-directions. Most of that (apart from the dis-
tinction of components in various directions) goes for energy as well; one
just needs to replace “spatial variable(s)” by “time variable” (though the
resulting constancy is still with respect to time). On the other hand, if the
Lagrangian explicitly depends on place, then momentum is not conserved.
Note that if one is dealing with particles rather than (as is standard in
fundamental physics) fields, then differences of particle coordinates, such
as x2−x1, are permitted in the Lagrangian while still conserving momen-
7Here we are attempting to avoid “violation” language. Unlike philosophers, physi-
cists routinely use the words “violate” and “violation” with little or no connotation
of naughtiness or absurdity. Some physicists study CP-violation; some study Lorentz-
violating theories of gravity. Talk of violation suggests some measure of surprise, but
does not imply that the subject matter is non-existent, criminal, naughty, or highly
implausible on balance. While it is useful to try to adapt one’s usage to one’s audience,
philosophers also should learn not to think that they hear what isn’t actually said by
physicists due to differences in vocabulary.
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tum, because translating the whole universe will leave such differences
unchanged: (x2 − c)− (x1 − c) = x2 − x1.
The physical objection against the idea of energy and/or momentum
redistribution might suffice to refute that approach. However, there is
a further difficulty for someone seeking to preserve energy conservation
for interactive dualism in the way outlined: it is exceedingly difficult to
think of a plausible compensation mechanism in the first place. It isn’t
at all clear either how such a mechanism could work metaphysically or
how it could be formulated so as to have an interface with physics. Such a
mechanism will maintain or aggravate the violation of time- and/or space-
translation invariance that, if not violated, would have ensured that con-
servation of energy and/or momentum. In terms of physics-friendliness,
nothing is gained and much is lost, somewhat like treating measles by
injecting influenza, or robbing Peter to repay Paul after robbing Paul.
In summary, redistribution approaches fail to achieve their goal, namely
upholding conservation, because they fail to recognize that the nonphys-
ical mind’s action on the brain violates time- and space-translation in-
variance and hence, by the converse first Noether theorem, implies that
energy and momentum conservation are violated in the sense relevant to
modern physics.
3. Unsuccessful Dualist Responses II:
Energy Redistribution vs. Locality
The proposal of energy redistribution to uphold conservation laws also
displays a radical failure to understand the target, that is, what the con-
servation laws in modern physics actually are. The previous section to
some extent played along with the assumption, typical in the philoso-
phy of mind, that physics is about particles in discrete locations. But in
modern physics, everything including such particle-like entities as protons
and electrons, is an excitation of one or more continuous fields with local
interactions. A field has one or more values at each time and place.8
In such physics, the conservation laws are local. Imagine dividing the
world into as many little mathematical boxes as you like with a space-
time coordinate system. In each little box, the amount of energy remains
constant except insofar as energy flows in or out through the box’s (imag-
inary) walls. Thus conservation of energy is not one equation, but one
equation for each point in space (Lange 2002, Chap. 5, Pitts 2019a), a
sort of continuous conjunction. This fact brings us back to the BPEC,
a formulation of local conservation laws: given any region of space, the
8These values are the same in all coordinate systems for “scalar” fields, but are
relative to coordinate systems in a rule-governed way for more complicated fields.
There can also be other forms of conventionality in “gauge theories”.
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change of energy within that region equals the flow of energy across the
boundaries of that region of space.
Ducasse, having previously proposed a conditionality view that we find
more reconcilable with physics (Ducasse 1951, Chap. 12), later proposed
that (Ducasse 1960, p. 89)
it might be the case that whenever a given amount of energy van-
ishes from, or emerges in, the physical world at one place, then an
equal amount of energy respectively emerges in, or vanishes from,
that world at another place.
The account is tantamount to a “teleportation” of energy from one place
to another, which might happen simultaneously or with a time lag (due to
the speed of light). But both versions face the problem that according to
modern physics, matter is continuous and acts locally through the prop-
agation of waves, which means that conservation laws apply locally and
that (at least assuming relativistic physics) a transport of energy can hap-
pen no faster than at the speed of light. The former version additionally
runs into the difficulty that simultaneity is relative according to relativis-
tic physics. To be sure, relativity might someday fall in favor of absolute
simultaneity (cf. Horˇava 2009), but even such a dramatic outcome would
not change the locality of conservation as long as the successor theories are
local field theories. Thus, redistribution fails to even recognize what the
correct target concept of conservation is, to say nothing of hitting it. The
BPEC excludes any form of redistribution as a way to uphold conserva-
tion in the sense that matters in modern physics. Given the correct, that
is local, form of conservation laws, compensation at a distance will ex-
clude space translation invariance and hence will imply non-conservation
of momentum both where the nonphysical mind acts and wherever any
compensation occurs. Compensating for one violation with an additional
one is hardly progress.
4. Unsuccessful Dualist Responses III:
Lowe’s Alteration of Constants
E. J. Lowe at some stage envisaged that the mind could act on the body
by changing physical constants, which he took to be an energy-conserving
proposal. A previous work noted that such a proposal would still imply
non-conservation (Pitts 2019a), but left a more detailed critique of this
proposal for the future. This paper takes up that issue. Lowe (1992,
p. 270) wrote (emphasis in the original):
According to this second line of thought, the mind exerts causal
influence on the body not through the exercise of psychic (non-
physical) forces of any sort, but through influencing the values of
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the so-called “constants” which feature in various physical force
laws – for instance, by influencing (presumably only locally and to
a vanishingly small degree) the value of the universal constant of
gravitation G or the value of the charge on the electron. Thus it
would turn out that these so-called “constants” are strictly speaking
variables.
Lowe envisaged that if the mind were able to change certain physical
constants, such as, e.g., the gravitational constant G or the value of the
electron charge e, it could influence the brain without adding to or sub-
tracting energy from it. He admits that “postulating variability in such
constants is in a sense at odds with the classical principle of the conserva-
tion of energy” (Lowe 1992, p. 270), but still prefers this to accepting the
violation of energy conservation, because “it is not now being suggested
that the mind has a power of creating energy ex nihilo or conversely anni-
hilating it” (Lowe 1992, p. 270). This latter statement makes it clear that
he believes that a change in physical constants does not result in energy
being added or subtracted.
Unfortunately, Lowe’s theory does not yield his desired result of energy
conservation. To see this, consider the following model calculation, which
is perhaps the simplest possible example representative of modern physics.
This calculation is intended not merely to refute Lowe’s proposal, but also
to make as widely available as possible the physics of conservation laws, a
topic often discussed but not often understood correctly in the philosophy
of mind.
Suppose a physical system on which the mind acts is a massive scalar
field φ(t, x) (in one spatial dimension for ease of calculation). A scalar
field is one number at each point in space and time; it is called a scalar
field because the number is the same in every coordinate system.9 In the
example calculation, this field stands in for all the usual physical fields
(electromagnetism, gravity, the weak and strong nuclear forces, the elec-
tron field, neutrino fields, etc., nearly all of which are more complicated
than scalar fields), while the mass parameter m stands in for whatever
physical constants Lowe envisages as varying due to mental influence.
The Euler-Lagrange field equation (also known as equation of motion)
follows from the principle of least action, which says roughly that the ac-
tion, a time integral of the Lagrangian, is as small as possible, given the
beginning and ending configurations. The Euler-Lagrange equations are
second-order partial differential equations whose solutions are the func-
9Most realistic fields are more complicated; for example, the electromagnetic field
comes from a 4-component potential, leaving one with 4 fields (the values of which
depend on the coordinate system), as well as four independent variables t, x, y, and
z in real 3-dimensional space. The toy calculation presented includes everything rele-
vant to understanding the more realistic calculation with more fields and more spatial
dimensions, while omitting a great deal of irrelevant complexity.
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tions for which a given functional, the action (the time integral of the
Lagrangian), is stationary, i.e., the system’s action is “least” or perhaps
“most” or at any rate unchanged by a small change in the dynamical
variables. The Lagrangian is basically the kinetic energy minus the po-
tential energy. For a local field theory (Goldstein 1980, Chap. 12), the
Lagrangian is given by a Lagrangian density by adding up (integrating)
the Lagrangian density over all points of space (here represented by x
because there is assumed to be only one spatial dimension):
L =
∫ +∞
−∞
dxL (1)
The Lagrangian density for this field is
L = 1
2
φ˙2 − 1
2
φ′2 − 1
2
k(t, x)φ2 (2)
where φ˙ is the partial time derivative ∂φ/∂t (describing how φ changes
over time at constant location x), φ′ is the partial spatial derivative ∂φ/∂x
(describing how φ changes from place to place at constant time t), and k
is the square of the “mass” of the field.10
Here k is allowed to vary in place and time to represent the influence
of Lowe’s constants-altering mind. One uses this Lagrangian density to
infer the equation of motion or field equation for this field, the Euler-
Lagrange equation for that field. The Euler-Lagrange equation in some
cases takes the form −ma+F = 0 and thus can be a mere rearrangement
of Newton’s second law, but the Lagrangian formalism is more general in
some respects and is the standard starting point for fundamental physics.
One can instantly see from this Lagrangian that energy is not conserved
in this case, because the Lagrangian explicitly depends on time due to
k(t, x). The details of the calculation are useful, however, in making as
accessible and simple as possible the mathematics-physics that is usually
missing in discussions of conservation laws in the philosophy of mind.
The principle of least action implies the Euler-Lagrange equation (ELE)
for the above system,
∂L
∂φ
− d
dt
∂L
∂φ˙
− d
dx
∂L
∂φ′
= 0 .
With the Lagrangian density from above substituted, the ELE ends up
reading
−k(t, x)φ− φ¨+ φ′′ = 0 . (3)
10Actually k must be the square of an inverse length; one converts such a thing to
a mass using the speed of light and Planck’s constant. The details are not important
here. Here such constants are set to the value of 1; one could set the speed of light
c to 1 by measuring time in years and distance in lightyears, for example. The term
“mass” is used because if one were to quantize this field, it would lead to quanta with
mass
√
k at least if k were constant.
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In order for energy conservation to hold in such a system, the following
continuity equation must hold (Goldstein 1980, Chap. 12):
d
dt
θ00 +
d
dx
θ10 = 0 (4)
This form of equation11 also describes the conservation of charge (Grif-
fiths 1989, p. 4). Returning to the case at hand, θ00 and θ
1
0 are components,
the energy density and energy flux density, respectively, of the canonical
energy-momentum tensor,
θµν =
∂L
∂
(
∂φ
∂xµ
) ∂φ
∂xν
− δµνL , (5)
with µ and ν both ranging from 0 to 1 and δ (the Kronecker δ) being 0 if
µ 6= ν and 1 if µ = ν. (It should be added that x0 is identical to t (time)
and x1 to x (the only spatial coordinate).) Thus, we obtain the energy
density
θ00 =
∂L
∂
(
∂φ
∂t
) ∂φ
∂t
− L = 1
2
φ˙2 +
1
2
φ′2 +
1
2
k(t, x)φ2 (6)
and the energy flux density:
θ10 =
∂L
∂
(
∂φ
∂x
) ∂φ
∂t
− 0 = −φ′φ˙ (7)
If one plugs the above expressions (6) and (7) into (4), one gets:
d
dt
(
1
2
φ˙2 +
1
2
φ′2 +
1
2
k(t, x)φ2
)
+
d
dx
(−φ′φ˙) =
φ¨φ˙+ φ˙′φ′ +
1
2
(
φ2
∂
∂t
k(t, x) + 2k(t, x)φ˙φ
)
− φ′′φ˙− φ˙′φ′ = 0
The terms in bold cancel out, and application of the Euler-Lagrange equa-
tion (3) yields:
(−k(t, x)φ− φ¨+ φ′′)(−φ˙) + 1
2
φ2
∂
∂t
k(t, x) = 0 ,
0 +
1
2
φ2
∂
∂t
k(t, x) 6= 0 .
11Unfortunately, there is no clear notation for these expressions, because neither the
partial derivative ∂ nor the ordinary derivative d notation is quite clear. In taking, for
example, the time derivative of the energy density, one wants all dependence on time,
whether implicitly through the fields and their derivatives, or explicitly through the
appearance of t itself (though that would be peculiar in this context), but none of the
dependence on space.
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In other words, the continuity equation (4) does not hold for energy
just in case k varies with time. Hence, precisely because of Lowe’s assump-
tion that the mind can alter physical constants, energy is not conserved
in this system! The crux is the term which represents Lowe’s alterable
constant k(t, x). Its time derivative does not become zero or cancel out
during the calculations. Thus one sees in the breach how time translation
symmetry implies the conservation of energy, because here the failure of
that symmetry implies non-conservation.
Might at least momentum be conserved, as Lowe (1992, p. 268) seems
to assume? Since the Lagrangian explicitly depends on place (due to
k(t, x)), momentum cannot be conserved either. Mathematically, momen-
tum conservation can be checked by the corresponding continuity equation
involving the momentum density
θ01 =
∂L
∂
(
∂φ
∂t
) ∂φ
∂x
− 0 = φ˙φ′
and momentum flux density
θ11 =
∂L
∂
(
∂φ
∂x
) ∂φ
∂x
− L = 1
2
φ˙2 − 1
2
φ′2 +
1
2
k(t, x)φ2 :
d
dt
θ01 +
d
dx
θ11 = 0 (8)
Running the above calculations on (8) yields
(−k(t, x)φ− φ¨+ φ′′)(−φ′) + 1
2
φ2
∂
∂x
k(t, x) = 0 , (9)
which, after use of (3), results in:
0 +
1
2
φ2
∂
∂x
k(t, x) 6= 0 (10)
Thus, momentum is not conserved either, precisely due to the spa-
tial variation of the erstwhile constant. One also sees that whenever and
wherever the “constant” is really constant, energy and momentum are
conserved, even if conservation does not hold in some regions, such as in
brains. To the trained eye, key qualitative features of these calculations
were evident in advance of doing the mathematics. But working the exam-
ple is useful for those not antecedently interested in classical field theory.
This mathematics shows what training the eye needs to see the failure
of Lowe’s varying-constants proposal as well as why non-conservation in
some regions doesn’t spoil conservation elsewhere.
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5. Problematic Dualist Response:
Ascribing Energy to the Soul
Another proposed way of constructing energy-conserving dualistic in-
teraction is to claim that the mind carries energy and that an increase of
energy in the body would be compensated by a corresponding decrease in
the mind and vice versa, so that no violation of energy conservation takes
place. Hart (1994, p. 268) explicitly offers such an account:
Energy (or mass-energy) is conserved, and conservation is a quan-
titative principle. So we need intrinsically psychological quantities.
(...) Once we have such psychological quantities, we may imagine
that as light from objects seen reaches the region of convergence
along the disembodied person’s lines of sight, it passes straight
through but loses some electromagnetic energy and, at a fixed rate
of conversion, that person acquires or is sustained in visual experi-
ence of those objects seen. (...) So we have solved the interaction
problem. To be sure, we have not imagined exactly how light en-
ergy converts into the psychic energy implicit in visual experience.
But then neither do physicists tell us how mass turns into energy
when an atom bomb goes off, and if their lacuna does not embarrass
them, neither need ours embarrass us.
Searle used similar talk of mental energy to argue that dualism violates
energy conservation (see Sec. 1). He identifies the problem as mental en-
ergy being “not fixed by physics” and hence not figuring in the “energetic
bookkeeping” of physics. As noted in Sec. 1, Searle didn’t explicitly say
that physical and mental energy are interconvertible. But does convert-
ibility of physical and mental energy, as suggested by Hart, really help
much?
Does mental energy even make sense, given that (to avoid mere equiv-
ocation on the word “energy”) mental energy would involve mathematical
properties of the non-physical mind? Which rate of change of a given be-
lief or desire offsets a speed of 2 meters per second for a 1 gram mass? In
the early 18th century it was often said that there was no proportionality
between mind and matter. Absent a treatment of the mind itself (not
just interaction with the brain) in terms of Lagrangian field theory, we
are unable to understand an ascription of energy to the mind in any sense
relevant to the conservation objection. But a treatment of the mind in
terms of Lagrangian field theory would make mental operations not merely
deterministic (which one might or might not accept), but deterministic in
a sense that involves causes that seem to have little or no connection to
reasons, beliefs, desires, etc. Absent the extraordinary accomplishment
that would be involved in addressing this objection, ascribing energy to
the mind appears hopeless at least as a way to uphold conservation laws.
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Regarding Hart’s parity claim for mass-energy conservation in a nu-
clear bomb, physics gives a detailed quantitative trade-off of two forms
of energy, mass-energy of some nuclei made of protons and neutrons, and
electromagnetic energy, all described in terms of various particles that sat-
isfy the relativistic equation E =
√
m2c4 + p2c2 (with m varying with the
particle type and presumably being 0 for photons).12 There is no dearth of
intelligibility regarding conservation in bombs. It is difficult to see what
Hart could want that physics does not supply, unless one is disturbed
that quantum mechanics seems not to be deterministic (in which case one
can satisfy oneself with a deterministic interpretation) or one laments the
essentially non-perturbative nature of quantum chromodynamics, which
makes it difficult to cash out verbal claims about nuclei as composed of
protons and neutrons, and protons and neutrons as composed of quarks.
By contrast, Hart’s proposal of mental energy is unintelligible apart from
a treatment of the mind in terms of Lagrangian field theory, which seems
quite unpromising. There is no parity between the two cases.
Even if one were prepared to ascribe energy to the soul and if some
exchange rates between mental and physical states were somehow stipu-
lated, it is still by no means clear that the result would be that energy is
conserved. Merely having exchange rates does not suffice, as anyone who
goes to an airport and finds MoneyCorp buying dollars for a certain num-
ber of pounds sterling and selling dollars for a very different number of
pounds will see. More seriously, both daily experience and (for those who
embrace it) libertarian freedom make it highly implausible that the tra-
jectory of thoughts will reliably harmonize with the trajectory of physical
matter so as to ensure conservation.
To our knowledge, the only philosopher who has seriously attempted
to ascribe mathematical properties to the soul is Robin Collins. To be
sure, his “dual-aspect model of the soul” (Collins 2011b) is not designed
to answer the objection from energy conservation (for which he offers a
different answer). His idea is that the soul has two kinds of properties,
subjective (or mental) and non-subjective (or physical) properties, thus
making the soul, on his definitions, a physical entity with additional sub-
jective properties. He defines a physical entity as one whose “states can
be described by some mathematical function” and the evolution of whose
states and their interaction with other physical systems “can be specified
by a set of mathematical equations” (Collins 2011b, p. 234).
How do the mental and physical aspects of the soul work together?
12This expression has the perhaps more familiar non-relativistic limit E = mc2 +
p2/2m using the binomial series expansion; dropping the rest-mass energy gives, after
expressing momentum in terms of velocity, mv2/2. It is not actually required that
photons have zero mass; the problem of the photon mass gives a physically interesting
example of (perhaps) permanent underdetermination from approximate but arbitrarily
close empirical equivalence (Pitts 2011).
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Collins proposes “linking laws” between mental states/qualia and physical
states within the soul, e.g., a certain vibrational pattern (brought about by
some specific brain activity) always produces a certain mental state/quale,
and vice versa. Be that as it may, this proposal, if mental-to-physical
causation is permitted, does not uphold the relevant conservation laws of
physics (assuming that physics is described by the principle of least action
or is even sufficiently well anticipated by that principle, as quantum field
theory, our best standard theory, is).
The symmetry-conservation law link (Noether’s first theorem and its
converse) implies that the conservation laws will hold if and only if the
laws are the same everywhere and always, which can be true only if
the soul either does nothing (or does nothing that wouldn’t have hap-
pened anyway, which looks like nothing in the physics), or does the same
thing everywhere and always throughout space-time. Collins admittedly
has his own response to the conservation law objection by appeal to the
supposed non-conservation of energy in general relativity (Collins 2008,
Collins 2011a). Unfortunately, as noted above, this response does not
work because general relativity in fact makes the situation for mind-to-
body causation harder, not easier (Pitts 2019b).
6. The Optimal Dualist Response?
Conditionality of Energy Conservation
We take it that the best reply a dualist can give (perhaps excepting
some essentially quantum mechanical approach) is the conditionality (or
biconditionality) response: energy is conserved in a system on the condi-
tion that no mind (or other non-physical entity, for that matter) acts on
the system; conversely, on the condition that a mind acts on the system,
energy is not conserved (Pitts 2019a). Whereas most of the other views
above are supposed to respect physics but in fact are in mathematical con-
flict with modern physics, this view, which is often taken to conflict with
physics (such as by Dennett and Bunge), is at least in accord with modern
physics in the sense of being an option allowed by Noether’s first theorem
and its converse. However, it should be made clear, the conditionality
response does not require any ascription of mathematical properties to
the soul (though it does of course ascribe mathematical properties to the
soul’s influence on physical fields; otherwise one could not even discuss
the conservation question in any serious fashion); at any rate, we reject
such an approach (see Sec. 5).
There seems to be nothing left of the energy conservation objection,
once one embraces the relevant mathematics of Lagrangian field theory
and Noether’s theorem and its converse, that isn’t simply a form of meta-
physical objection about a causal nexus or an open begging of the question
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(the problem with having souls act on bodies is that then souls act on bod-
ies). If interactionism is under discussion, then there simply isn’t a strong
presumption in favor of exact energy conservation in the brain that has
a claim on interactionists, except insofar as one has looked at the brain –
which makes it less of a presumption than an empirical result.
Having confidence that one can extrapolate conservation laws into the
brain is just having confidence in some form of physicalism, Leibnizian pre-
established harmony, epiphenomenalism, or some other non-interactionist
view. If interactionism weren’t motivated by arguments, then refusal to
extrapolate conservation into the brain would be unreasonable, like think-
ing that conservation holds everywhere except on Venus. But interaction-
ism is in fact motivated by arguments, such as (e.g.) that causal closure
is a self-defeating belief (Swinburne 2018), so this refusal to extrapolate
to exact conservation in the brain is not frivolous. Looking at the brain,
especially if one knows how carefully to look, should be decisive or at least
highly constraining.
Recall that Noether’s first theorem has instantiations such as that en-
ergy is conserved on the condition that a system evinces translational
symmetry over time (likewise momentum and space). The interactionist
dualist can plausibly suggest that mental interactions simply do not con-
serve energy, because they break the temporal symmetry of the pertinent
system, i.e. the brain.13 Such a claim might seem disturbing if one takes
conservation laws as a black box received on the authority of Science,
as is customary in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. But it will
seem natural, even obvious, if one frames the question in terms of the
real physics of fields (or its warmup exercise in terms of classical fields,
rather) and contemplates Noether’s first theorem. In other words, if the
mind makes it the case that the brain’s Lagrangian (or the Lagrangian
of whatever system the mind acts on) explicitly depends on time, then
energy is not conserved (see also the analysis of Lowe’s proposal above).
Scientists and engineers routinely study systems that have time- and
space-dependence; simply by not studying the entire universe, one intro-
duces time- and space-dependence into the system of interest because of
the influence of everything outside the system. While such considerations
help to show that the conditionality response is possible, the converse
first Noether theorem makes this conditionality response obligatory (at
least within the confines of Lagrangian field theory): conservation implies
symmetry, so equivalently non-symmetry implies non-conservation. Thus
if Susie decides to raise her arm and her soul acts on nerves in her brain
to start the relevant causal chain, then the time- and space-dependence
of her soul’s influence (in her brain and not on the Moon, during her life-
13“Breaking” a symmetry, much like “violating” a conservation law, is not necessarily
bad.
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time and not before or after) implies the non-conservation of energy and
momentum in her brain at that time. So what?
In effect, this reply rejects P2’ as insufficiently supported by physics
and dialectically unavailable in this context. Ironically, it is exactly this
premise which detractors of dualism have taken to be a cornerstone of
physics and which many dualists have striven to uphold in order to re-
spect science. But submitting to physics is a good idea only if one cor-
rectly describes what physics actually says. Otherwise one is doing the
philosophy of A-level (secondary school) chemistry, not the philosophy of
physics (to recall a warning by Ladyman et al. 2007, p. 24).
The Noether-inspired (bi)conditionality response implies that anti-
dualists can no longer employ armchair arguments from energy conser-
vation against interactionism, because the distance between the premise
and the conclusion has disappeared. One could still try to complain that
energy isn’t conserved given interactionism, but it is unclear why this is
an objection. It seems to amount to saying this: the problem with having
souls act on bodies is that then souls act on bodies. Restating the interac-
tionist view isn’t much of an objection to interactionism, at least to those
who sympathize with interactionism in the first place. Physics often and
successfully deals with systems in which the equations have time- and/or
space-dependence, so why not have one more example?
Note that recognizing (bi)conditionality does not necessarily preclude
every objection from energy conservation against dualism; one could look
at the brain and then claim that, as a matter of fact, energy does seem
to be conserved and hence interactionism is false. However, it is doubt-
ful that framing a neuroscientific objection to interactionist dualism in
terms of conservation laws would ever be profitable, because access to
(non)conservation is quite indirect, involving calculating a function of
derivatives of another function, as appeared above. Rather, one could
simply observe that empirical neuroscience leaves insufficient room for a
soul to act on the brain in the right sort of way.
What about quantum-mechanical approaches of mind-brain interac-
tion, towards which there is a commendable trend in recent dualistic lit-
erature (e.g., Corradini and Meixner 2014, Halvorson 2011)? Presumably
a quantum model is the best approach for anyone aiming to give a de-
fense or positive account of interactionist dualism, something that we are
by no means attempting here. Also, quantum approaches might become
interesting for dualists should energy turn out to be in fact conserved in
brains, for then quantum physics would seem to be the only way to bridge
mind and brain in a potentially energy-conserving manner. However, one
of us takes the view that a closer look at the neuroscience of volitional
action suggests that there probably is a conspicuous gap in the chain of
bio-physical causes, a gap that might well be filled by an immaterial mind
(Cucu 2019). If experimental bounds from neuroscience sufficiently con-
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strain any putative nonphysical mental influence describable classically,
then a quantum approach might be required if interactionist dualists are
to address the resulting a posteriori objection.
In light of all this, we take the conditionality response to be help-
fully robust. To be sure, the conditionality response is compatible with
quantum mechanics; it just does not need quantum mechanics. First,
conservation has its best chance of posing an objection to interaction-
ism in precisely the context faced here, namely, classical field theory;
since, as we claim to have shown, no a priori objection can be upheld in
light of Noether’s first theorem, the conditionality response is stable in
so far as it is fully in accord with Noether’s theorem. Second, the con-
ditionality response does not depend on specific calculations that might
be questioned, such as the account of Beck and Eccles (1992; see Wilson
1999 for a critique). Third, it is not subject to debates about the right
interpretation of the underlying physics. Some claim that the measure-
ment problem in quantum mechanics necessarily involves the mind (e.g.,
Wigner 1967, Schwartz et al. 2005, Halvorson 2011); many others ignore
such an approach completely and focus on purely physical interpretations
of quantum physics. At any rate, coming up with a good quantum model
is quite another matter from coming up with some quantum model. No
such interpretive issues arise in classical mechanics and field theory, so
the treatment above will remain available.
It is also worth recalling that some physicists, aiming to address the
measurement problem in quantum mechanics, already accept energy non-
conservation even apart from the philosophy of mind (e.g., Bassi et al.
2013),14 as Butterfield noted earlier. Such examples show that experts
are not nearly as threatened by the prospect of energy non-conservation
as many philosophers of mind. Conservation laws are useful accounting
devices and sanity checks, but it is not considered absolutely obligatory
that they hold exactly and at all times and places.
7. Conclusion
The objection from energy conservation against interactionist dualism
relies on the premises that (1) interactionist dualism entails that energy
is not conserved in brains and (2) energy is (physically) necessarily con-
served in brains. In contrast to 18th century, at least since the later 19th
century, interactionist dualists have sought to avoid premise (1) and up-
hold premise (2) to make dualism conservation-friendly. These proposals
fail in multiple ways. Special attention has been given to a proposal by
Lowe, which in fact entails the non-conservation of both energy and mo-
mentum, contrary to his intentions. The best account in case energy is in
14We thank an anonymous referee for this reference.
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fact not conserved in brains is the conditionality response, which derives
directly from the first Noether theorem. Should energy turn out to be
conserved exactly, essentially quantum-mechanical approaches might be
the only chance for interactionist dualism.
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